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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE CALIFORNIA CONSTI-
TUTION PROTECTS RIGHTS OF FREE SPEECH AND
PETITION, REASONABLY EXERCISED, IN PRIVATELY
OWNED SHOPPING CENTERS-Robins v. Pruneyard
Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr.
854 (1979).
On Saturday, November 17, 1975, plaintiff-appellant Mi-
chael Robins and some other high school students entered the
Pruneyard Shopping Center' and attempted to solicit support
for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against
"Zionism." Although the general public is openly invited to
visit the Pruneyard, the center maintains a policy that prohib-
its publicly expressive activity by any tenant or visitor if the
activity is not directly related to the center's commercial pur-
poses. It appears that this policy, which prohibits the circula-
tion of petitions, has been "strictly and disinterestedly en-
forced." 2
Robins and his friends set up a card table in the center of
the mall and attempted to discuss their concerns with mall
patrons in order to gather signatures for a petition to be sent
to the White House. The activity was reported to have been
"peaceful and apparently well-received by Pruneyard pa-
trons."3 Before long, a mall security guard informed the appel-
lants that they were violating a Pruneyard regulation since
they were soliciting without permission, and he suggested that
they move to the public sidewalks adjacent to the shopping
center. The youths left the center without further incident.
Subsequently, Robins and the other students brought suit
to enjoin the Pruneyard from denying them access to the center
for the purpose of soliciting signatures for a petition to the
© 1979 by Stephen G. Opperwall.
1. The Pruneyard is a privately owned shopping center located in Campbell,
California, a suburb of San Jose. The shopping area, consisting of 65 shops, 10 restau-
rants, and one theater, covers 16 acres and is surrounded by five acres of parking area,
also privately owned. The Pruneyard is bounded on two sides by private property,
while the other two sides border public streets and sidewalks. Robins v. Pruneyard
Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 902, 592 P.2d 341, 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 855, review
granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1979) (No. 79-289).
2. Id., 592 P.2d at 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
3. Id., 592 P.2d at 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
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government. The Superior Court of Santa Clara County re-
fused to grant the injunction. The First District Court of Ap-
peal affirmed that judgment and Robins appealed to the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court. In a four-three decision, the California
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling, enjoined the
Pruneyard from denying the appellants access, and held that
"the soliciting at a shopping center of signatures for a petition
to the government is an activity protected by the California
Constitution."'
The fundamental issues presented by this case involve the
conflict between constitutional protections of private property
and those afforded first amendment expression. In resolving
the conflict, the court addressed essentially two questions:
first, whether there is a federally protected property right that
cannot be compromised by balancing it against a state consti-
tutional right to free speech; and second, absent such a prop-
erty right, whether the California Constitution protects speech
and other expressive activity in private shopping centers.
Underlying the first question is the concept that although
an individual state may afford its citizens more expansive
rights than does the Federal Constitution, a state may not
expand one right if doing so would diminish another right guar-
anteed by the Federal Constitution. The first issue was the
major hurdle for the Robins court. Had the court found that
shopping center owners possessed a property right protected by
the United States Constitution, the second question would
have become moot by virtue of constitutional supremacy
clauses.'
The California court had last addressed these issues in
Diamond v. Bland (Diamond II).1 Diamond II purportedly fol-
lowed the rationale of Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner7 in finding that
4. Id., 592 P.2d at 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
5. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
CAL. CONST. art. III, § 1 provides:
The State of California is an inseparable part of the United States of
America, and the United States Constitution is the supreme law of the
land.
6. 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974) reversing Diamond v.
Bland (Diamond I), 3 Cal. 3d 653, 447 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970).
7. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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no first amendment rights existed at the private shopping cen-
ter since the "plaintiffs [had] alternative, effective channels
of communication." ' In Robins, the respondent (Pruneyard)
contended that Diamond II had been correctly decided, that it
was grounded firmly in Lloyd and that it necessarily controlled
the instant case. The Pruneyard argued that Lloyd had not
merely addressed the issue of first amendment speech rights,
but more importantly, it had recognized the existence of pri-
vate property rights protected by the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. Consequently, although the respondent agreed
that states can afford greater rights than those afforded by the
Federal Constitution, it argued that by enforcing Robins'
rights of free speech and petition, the private property rights
guaranteed by Lloyd would be impermissibly undermined.
Appellants, on the other hand, contended that Lloyd had
defined only first amendment rights and had failed to create
any property rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
This being the case, they argued, California is free to expand
the first amendment rights that Lloyd decided not to extend.
Alternatively, the appellants contended that even if Lloyd
had created constitutional property rights, California was still
free to regulate the shopping center for the proper state purpose
of safeguarding the constitutional right of petition. They
argued that this right is certainly equal to other public interests
which are routinely held to justify restrictions on private prop-
erty.
The court first addressed the issue of whether Lloyd identi-
fied constitutionally protected property rights, stating: "Lloyd
held that a shopping center owner could prohibit distribution
of leaflets when they communicated no information relating to
the center's business and when there was an adequate, alter-
nate means of communication."'
In Lloyd, the United States Supreme Court framed the
issue in terms of first amendment rights. There, the Court
stated:
The basic issue in this case is whether respondents, in the
exercise of asserted First Amendment rights, may distrib-
ute handbills on Lloyd's private property contrary to its
wishes and contrary to a policy against all handbilling.o
8. 11 Cal. 3d at 335, 521 P.2d at 463, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
9. 23 Cal. 3d at 904, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
10. 407 U.S. at 567.
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As the California Supreme Court in Robins points out, the
holding in Lloyd was also cast in first amendment terms:
We hold that there has been no such dedication of Lloyd's
privately owned and operated shopping center to public
use as to entitle respondents to exercise therein the as-
serted First Amendment rights."
In so noting, the California court promptly discarded the claim
that Lloyd had defined fifth amendment property rights and
asserted that references in Lloyd to the fifth and fourteenth
amendments were limited to a discussion of the state action
requirements necessary for any finding of a taking of property
without due process. Therefore, since Lloyd was a first amend-
ment case, the California majority concluded that state courts
are free to expand the declared first amendment freedoms.
The court next focused sharply on the power of the govern-
ment to regulate private property for the general welfare. It
asserted that
all private property is held subject to the power of the
government to regulate its use for the public welfare ....
Property rights must yield to the public interest served by
zoning laws, to environmental needs, and to many other
public concerns.'2
Moreover, the court asserted that it is "thoroughly established
in this country that the rights preserved to the individual by
these constitutional provisions are held in subordination to the
rights of society. '"3
Citing statistics to support its contention that suburban
shopping centers are continuing to take over the functions of
yesterday's central business block, the court emphasized that
property rights must be "redefined in response to a swelling
demand that ownership be responsible and responsive to the
needs of the social whole."'" Furthermore, the court pointed out
11. 23 Cal. 3d at 904, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856 (quoting Lloyd Corp.
v. Tanner, 407 U.S. at 570).
12. 23 Cal. 3d at 906, 592 P.2d at 344, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 857 (quoting Agricultural
Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 392, 403, 546 P.2d 687, 694, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 183, 190 (1976), appeal dismissed 429 U.S. 802 (1976) (no substantial federal
question)).
13. 23 Cal. 3d at 906, 592 P.2d at 344-45, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 857-58 (quoting Miller
v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 488, 234 P. 381, 385 (1925)).
14. 23 Cal. 3d at 906-07, 592 P.2d at 345, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858 (quoting
Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, which quoted Powell, The Rela-
tionship Between Property Rights and Civil Rights, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 135, 149-50
(1963)).
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that rights even greater than free speech are at stake, namely,
the right of the people to initiate political change through peti-
tion, initiative, referendum, and recall."
The court then proceeded to discuss the second
issue-whether the California Constitution guarantees the
right to gather signatures at shopping centers. There is no stat-
ute that specifically provides this right, but the California Con-
stitution does provide:
Every person may freely speak, write, and publish his or
her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of the right. A law may not restrain or abridge lib-
erty of speech or press."
The court noted that California did not adopt the exact word-
ing of the Bill of Rights and that California decisions have
consistently afforded more extensive liberty of speech than has
the federal system.
The United States Supreme Court, in Lloyd, found that
allowing first amendment guarantees in private shopping cen-
ters where the subject matter is unrelated to center activity
and where alternative forums exist significantly compromises
the private property rights of the owner, while adding little, if
anything, to the free speech rights of the public.'7 In direct
contrast, the California Supreme Court found that prohibiting
free expression in shopping centers seriously compromises con-
stitutional rights of free speech and petition, while the infringe-
ment of the owner's private property interest is "largely theo-
retical."'
The California Supreme Court overruled Diamond I and
concluded that the California Constitution "protects speech
and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even
when the centers are privately owned."' 9 The court qualified
this conclusion by emphasizing that it was not considering the
property rights of homeowners or modest retail establishments,
nor was it invalidating all time, place, and manner restrictions
of first amendment activity. 0
Dissenting, Justice Richardson contended that the major-
15. 23 Cal. 3d at 907-08, 592 P.2d at 345, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
16. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
17. 407 U.S. at 564, 567.
18. 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
19. Id., 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
20. See In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 852-53, 434 P.2d 353, 357-58, 64 Cal. Rptr.
97, 101-02 (1967).
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ity opinion "clearly violates federal constitutional guarantees
announced in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner ... "2' Richardson dis-
cussed the findings of the trial court and noted that the major-
ity had virtually ignored them. These findings included the
presence of many adequate, alternative forums and the ab-
sence of any relationship between the mall and the petition.
The dissent contended that the trial court's decision was com-
pelled by the holdings in Lloyd and Diamond II. Moreover,
Justice Richardson argued that Lloyd established property
rights protected by the Federal Constitution that could not be
circumvented by interpretation of state constitutional law.
The dissent also pointed out that Lloyd had specifically
stated that it was addressing fifth amendment property rights
and not merely first amendment speech rights as the majority
claimed. In Lloyd, the Court stated: "We granted certiorari to
consider petitioner's contention that the decision below vio-
lates rights of private property protected by the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments."" The Lloyd decision also noted:
It would be an unwarranted infringement of property
rights to require [mall owners] to yield to the exercise of
First Amendment rights under circumstances where alter-
native avenues of communication exist. Such an accomo-
dation would diminish property rights without signifi-
cantly enhancing the asserted right of free speech."
As a result, the dissent contended that Lloyd "was, and is, a
property rights case of controlling force in the litigation before
us."24
There are several different viewpoints on the relationship
of Lloyd and Robins to earlier precedent. On the one hand
there is the contention that Lloyd established constitutionally
guaranteed property rights and that Robins failed to follow
precedent. The middle position, embraced by a greater number
of lawyers, is that the meaning of Lloyd is far from crystal
clear, and is subject to many varying interpretations, each ar-
guably consistent with the Lloyd opinion.25 At the opposite end
21. 23 Cal. 3d at 911, 592 P.2d at 348, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
22. 407 U.s. at 552-53.
23. Id. at 567.
24. 23 Cal. 3d at 913, 592 P.2d at 349, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 862 (italics in original).
25. See, e.g., Lenrich Associates v. Heyda, 504 P.2d 112, (Or. 1972), which dem-
onstrates how Lloyd is not subject to a single, clear interpretation. Of the six justices
on the Oregon Supreme Court hearing the case, four wrote separate opinions (one
dissenting), each demonstrating a different interpretation of Lloyd.
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of the spectrum is the belief that Lloyd is the case that de-
parted from earlier precedent in its failure to affirm the pre-
ferred status of speech rights over private property rights de-
clared in Marsh v. Alabama"6 and Amalgamated Food Employ-
ees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza.7
The United States Supreme Court has decided to review
the Robins decision. 28 A clarification of the meaning of Lloyd
and the status of first amendment rights on private property,
therefore, should be forthcoming. If the Robins decision stands,
the greatest question will likely concern the scope of the rule
here established. It is foreseeable that there will be attempts
to limit the holding to petitioning only, rather than all first
amendment expression. Whether the rule extends to other
forms of private property is left unanswered. Justice Newman
emphasized that the court was not considering the rights of
individual homeowners or owners of "modest retail establish-
ments. '2 However, the line that divides a shopping center from
a modest retail establishment is certainly not clear.
It is equally unclear what constitutes "reasonable regula-
tions" on time, place, and manner of expressive activity, or
who will make, enforce and inform the public of these regula-
tions at each center. There seems to be little doubt that the
shopping centers and free speech advocates will be back in the
courts soon to litigate some of the questions that Robins has
raised.
Stephen G. Opperwall
26. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Marsh stated:
When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against
those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must
here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred
position.
Id. at 509. See also Note, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner: The Demise of Logan Valley and the
Disguise of Marsh, 61 GEo. L.J. 1187 (1973); Note, First Amendment Rights vs. Private
Property Rights-The Death of the "Functional Equivalent," 27 MIAMI L. REv. 219
(1972).
27. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
28. 48 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1979) (No. 79-289).
29. 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860 (quoting Diamond
v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d at 345, 521 P.2d at 470, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 478 (dissenting opinion)).
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CHILD CUSTODY-PHYSICAL DISABILITY THAT AF-
FECTS PARENT'S ABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN
PURELY PHYSICAL ACTIVITIES WITH CHILD IS NOT A
SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCE THAT
JUSTIFIES CHANGE OF CUSTODY-In re Marriage of
Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 598 P.2d 36, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1979).
William and Ellen Carney were married in December 1968,
established a home in New York, and by January 1971, had two
sons. The marriage faltered shortly thereafter and the parties
separated with Ellen relinquishing custody of the children to
William by written agreement. Subsequently, William and the
boys moved to California where William began cohabiting with
a woman named Lori, who acted as a stepmother to the chil-
dren.'
In August 1976, William was involved in a motor vehicle
accident which left him a quadriplegic. As of the date of trial,
he had been hospitalized for about a year, but was to be dis-
charged shortly.'
William brought the instant action in May 1977 seeking a
dissolution of his marriage to Ellen. Ellen moved for an order
awarding her immediate custody of the children. The trial
court granted Ellen's motion and ordered that the boys be
moved to New York, in spite of the fact that Ellen had neither
visited them nor contributed to their support since the separa-
tion. William brought this appeal from the custody order, con-
tending that the trial court had abused its discretion,' and that
the ruling violated his right to equal protection and due process
of the law.4
The California Supreme Court began by acknowledging
the difficulty of the task before it.
In this case of first impression we are called upon to
resolve an apparent conflict between two strong public pol-
icies: the requirement that a custody award serve the best
interests of the child, and the moral and legal obligation
© 1980 by Donald S. Black
1. In re Marriage of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 729, 598 P.2d 36, 37, 157 Cal. Rptr.
383, 384 (1979).
2. Id., 598 P.2d at 37, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
3. Id., 598 P.2d at 37, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
4. Id. at 729 n.3, 598 P.2d at 37 n.3, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 384 n.3. See, e.g., Adoption
of Richardson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 222, 59 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1967), where the court of appeal
held that persons who were denied the right to adopt a child merely because they were
deaf mutes were denied equal protection and due process of law.
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of society to respect the civil rights of its physically handi-
capped members, including their right not to be deprived
of their children because of their disability.5
The decision itself, however, indicates that the issue was much
more clear-cut and the outcome far more easily reached.
Because this was a case where a party sought to change a
prior custody agreement, the trial court was invested with less
discretion than in the usual case where the parents have re-
cently separated and a custody award is being made for the
first time. The parameters of this discretion are defined by the
relevant policy considerations involved: that there be an end
to litigation and that it is generally undesirable to change a
child's established mode of living. Thus, the test that has
evolved requires a persuasive showing of substantially changed
circumstances affecting the welfare of the child.7
With one exception, the changes that Ellen pointed out
were insufficient to support the order changing custody. She
argued, first, that, although she was not working at the time
of the separation from William, she was gainfully employed at
the time of the trial; this argument was specious, however, as
her gross income was only $500 per month, while William's was
more than $1750.1 Second, she had argued that, because Wil-
liam's relationship with Lori seemed to be ending, he would
have to hire a babysitter to care for the children; she admitted,
however, that if she were granted custody she would have to do
the same Ellen's other arguments were similarly insubstan-
tial. 0
5. 24 Cal. 3d at 728, 598 P.2d at 36-37, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84.
6. Id. at 730-31, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385. See also: Connolly v.
Connolly, 214 Cal. App. 2d 433, 436, 29 Cal. Rptr. 616, 618 (1963); Bemis v. Bemis, 89
Cal. App. 2d 80, 90, 200 P.2d 84, 91 (1948).
The court expressly disapproved Loudermilk v. Loudermilk, 208 Cal. App. 2d 705,
25 Cal. Rptr. 434 (1962), which had held that these policies were not applicable when
custody was originally awarded pursuant to an agreement between the parties rather
than a court determination. 24 Cal. 3d at 731 n.4, 598 P.2d at 38 n.4, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
385 n.4.
7. 24 Cal. 3d at 730, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
8. Id. at 731-32, 598 P.2d at 39, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
9. Id. at 732, 598 P.2d at 39, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
10. Ellen had also argued that if she were granted custody, she would move out
of her one bedroom apartment and into a larger one. However, the children were
already living in a four bedroom house which had a large living room and back yard.
Finally, Ellen argued that the older child should be taken to a dentist, and that the
younger child had a problem with bed wetting. There was no evidence in either case,
however, that medical intervention was necessary or desirable. Id., 598 P.2d at 39, 157
Cal. Rptr. at 386.
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If the trial court had ordered the change of custody solely
on the basis of these arguments, it clearly would have been an
abuse of discretion. However, it was evident that the lower
court had placed preeminent weight on a single fac-
tor-William's physical disability. There was uncontroverted
expert testimony indicating that William's physical condition
did not reduce his effectiveness as a father, and that he was
able to provide a stable and healthy home life for the children. I'
Nevertheless, the lower court, possessed of a stereotypical view
of the physically disabled, focused only on traditional notions
of fathering, i.e., that a normal father-son relationship requires
joint participation in activities such as fishing, football, and
baseball. 11
The California Supreme Court rejected this notion and
held that it is improper for a court to rely solely on a person's
physical handicap as prima facie evidence of that person's fit-
ness or unfitness as a parent. 3 Rather, a court must weigh all
relevant factors and determine "whether the parent's condition
will in fact have a substantial and lasting adverse effect on the
best interests of the child.""
Essentially without precedent, the supreme court's hold-
ing was rooted in a strong public policy favoring access by
11. William was examined by a licensed clinical psychologist who specialized in
child development. He testified that:
William had an IQ of 127, was a man of superior intelligence, excellent
judgment and ability to plan, and had adapted well to his handicap. He
observed good interaction between William and his boys, and described
the latter as self-disciplined, sociable, and outgoing. On the basis of his
tests and observations, Dr. Share gave as his professional opinion that
neither of the children appeared threatened by William's physical condi-
tion; the condition did not in any way hinder William's ability to be a
father to them, and would not be a detriment to them if they remained
in his home ....
Id. at 733-34, 598 P.2d at 40, 157 Cal. Rptr. 387.
12. The trial judge was quoted extensively by the supreme court:
I think it would be detrimental to the boys to grow up until age 18 in the
custody of their father. It wouldn't be a normal relationship between
father and boys . . . . He can't do anything for the boys himself except
maybe talk to them and teach them, be a tutor, which is good, but it's
not enough.
Id. at 735, 598 P.2d at 41, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 388. (Emphasis in original.)
13. Id. at 736, 598 P.2d at 42, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
14. Id., 598 P.2d at 42, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 389. The court notes that the Welfare
and Institutions Code makes a similar point in a slightly different context: "No parent
shall be found to be incapable of exercising proper and effective parental care or control
solely because of a physical disability .... " Id. at 736 n.8, 598 P.2d at 42 n.8, 157
Cal. Rptr. at 389 n.8 (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(a) (West Supp. 1978)).
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handicapped persons to all civil and social rights."5 Coupled
with this was the fact that disabled persons are becoming more
mobile through the use of modern technology. And even if this
were not true in William Carney's case, the court indicated
that its decision would remain unchanged.
Contemporary psychology confirms what wise families
have perhaps always known-that the essence of parenting
is not to be found in the harried rounds of daily car-pooling
endemic to modern suburban life, or even in the doggedly
dutiful acts of "togetherness" committed every weekend
by well meaning fathers and mothers across America.
Rather, its essence lies in the ethical, emotional, and intel-
lectual guidance the parent gives to the child throughout
his formative years and often beyond."
The court thus resolved the "apparent conflict" between the
public policy that a custody decision be determined according
to the best interests of the child and the public policy that
society respect the rights of physically handicapped persons by
finding that the conflict was more illusory than real.
As a reaffirmation of the rights of the physically disabled,
Carney will no doubt have an impact beyond its facts and,
indeed, beyond the borders of the state of California. Within
California, the decision will serve to buttress the work that the
legislature has already begun. Furthermore, as the first explicit
holding of its kind by a state's highest court,'7 Carney puts the
15. "It is the policy of this state to encourage and enable disabled persons to
participate fully in the social and economic life of this state .... Id. at 730, 598 P.2d
at 44, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (quoting CAL. Gov'T CODE § 19230(a) (West Supp. 1979)).
See also CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 4450-4458 (West Supp. 1979) (requires handicapped
access to publicly funded facilities); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § § 19955-19959 (West
Supp. 1979) (requires handicapped access to private buildings which are open to the
general public); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 4500 (West Supp. 1978) (requires handicapped
access to public transit systems); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5070.5(c) (West Supp. 1979)
(requires handicapped access to public recreational trails); CAL. VEH. CODE § § 22507.8,
22511.5-.8 (West Supp. 1979) (special parking privileges for handicapped drivers).
16. 24 Cal. 3d at 739, 598 P.2d at 44, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
17. The high courts of two other states have heard cases involving somewhat
similar facts, but have not stated their holdings in such explicit terms. In Rains v.
Alston, 265 Ark. 108, 576 S.W.2d 505 (1979), the parents of a blind and divorced mother
filed a petition to be appointed guardians of the mother's child. The Arkansas Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's order awarding custody to the parents, but held the
mother's disability was not the controlling issue. In Bailey v. Bailey, 474 S.W.2d 389
(1971), the court affirmed the trial court's order granting custody to a father who had
lost both legs. However, a major factor in this decision was the obvious unfitness of
the mother to assume custody, and the fact that the father had previously performed
most, if not all, of the parenting functions.
[Vol. 20
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California Supreme Court at the forefront of the movement
aimed at guaranteeing the disabled total access to all of so-
ciety's benefits.
Donald S. Black

LABOR RELATIONS - THE NATIONAL LABOR RELA-
TIONS ACT WILL NOT BE CONSTRUED TO EXTEND TO
LAY TEACHERS EMPLOYED BY CHURCH-OPERATED
SCHOOLS - NLRB v. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440
U.S. 490 (1979).
In 1976, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
Board) ordered two groups of Catholic high schools, that had
allegedly violated provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA),' to negotiate with NLRB certified unions wishing
to represent the lay members of their faculties.' Arguing that
the Board lacked jurisdiction over church-affiliated institu-
tions, the religious schools maintained that they did not fall
within the ambit of jurisdictional authority granted to the
Board by the Act and that the exercise of such jurisdiction
would violate the first amendment.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the
schools and declined to enforce the NLRB's order.3 In reaching
its decision, the court first concluded that the Board's practice
of asserting jurisdiction over all nonsecular organizations, ex-
cept those which are "completely religious," was improper
since the distinction between "completely religious" and "just
religiously associated" did not provide adequate guidelines for
the exercise of the Board's discretion. Second, the court con-
cluded that subjecting church-operated schools to the NLRB's
authority would interfere with -the schools' right to manage
their own affairs in accordance with their religious tenets, con-
stituting an impermissible intrusion into protected first
amendment activity.
In granting the NLRB's petition for certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court considered two questions: 1) whether
teachers in schools operated by a church to teach both religious
and secular subjects are within the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Act; and 2) if the Act grants such jurisdiction,
© 1980 by Lynn Toma.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Two of the high schools are
operated by the Catholic Bishop of Chicago while the other five are run by the Diocese
of Fort Wayne-South Bend. Both groups of schools provide instruction in secular as
well as religious subjects. NLRB v. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 491-
92 (1979).
2. The NLRB originally reviewed the case in the Catholic Bishop of Chicago, a
corporation sole, 224 N.L.R.B. 1221 (1976) and the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend,
Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1226 (1976).
3. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977).
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whether its exercise violates the guarantees of the religious
clauses of the first amendment. In affirming the appellate
court's decision, the Supreme Court held that the NLRA did
not authorize the Board to exercise jurisdiction over lay teach-
ers at church-operated schools.
Addressing the first question, the Supreme Court applied
a basic rule of statutory construction that no act of Congress
would be construed as violating the Constitution if any other
construction was possible. The Court recognized that reading
the NLRA as granting the Board jurisdiction over religious
schools would most likely lead to a constitutional violation
since governmental inquiry by the Board into the realm of the
schools' religious affairs would entangle church and state. The
Court, therefore, focused its analysis on the language and legis-
lative history of the statute in order to ascertain whether the
asserted construction was actually intended.
In examining the purpose of the Act, the Court noted there
was "no clear expression of an affirmative intention by Con-
gress that teachers in church-operated schools should be cov-
ered by the Act"' since Congress never considered religious
schools in relation to the Act. The Court discovered that all of
the congressional discussions regarding the NLRA dealt with
other aspects of the statute. For example, during the 1935 de-
bates, consideration was directed toward industrial recovery
and employment in private industry.5 Later, in 1947, Congress
reviewed the Board's jurisdiction, but only as to nonprofit in-
stitutions in general which they decided were outside the scope
of the Act.' Finally, in 1974, Congress passed an amendment
bringing nonprofit religious hospitals under the NLRA.
Church-operated schools simply never were mentioned or al-
luded to during any of those occasions.
Based upon its finding that the NLRA's language and his-
tory failed to reveal any clear congressional intent that the Act
encompass church-operated schools, the Supreme Court rea-
4. 490 U.S. at 504. There "'must be present the affirmative intention of the
Congress clearly expressed'" before the Court will sanction the Board's exercise of
jurisdiction. Id. at 509 n.1 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963)).
5. 440 U.S. at 505 (citing 79 CONG. REc. 7573 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Wagner),
2 N.L.R.B., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 2341,
2343).
6. 440 U.S. at 505 (citing H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), 1 N.L.R.B.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr 1947, at 34).
7. Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974).
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soned that it was under no compulsion to extend the Board's
jurisdiction to these schools. Consequently, it declined to inter-
pret the Act in a manner that would grant such power.
Mr. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, charged that requiring
that there be a "clear expression of an affirmative intention of
Congress" to confer jurisdiction was an improper standard of
review invented by the majority to expediently decide the
case.' In his estimation, the correct test would have been to see
whether the proposed construction of the statute was "fairly
possible."' Justice Brennan also criticised the majority for ig-
noring important aspects of legislative history ° and for exhibit-
ing reluctance to deal with the constitutional questions.
By construing the NLRA narrowly, the Supreme Court
declined to formally confront the issue of whether placing non-
secular schools under the authority of a government agency
would violate the first amendment's proscription against exces-
sive entanglement between church and state. The exact posi-
tion of the Court on this issue is unclear. What is certain,
however, is that the National Labor Relations Board v. the
Catholic Bishop of Chicago places schools affiliated with
churches beyond the pale of governmental supervision as far as
labor practices are concerned.
Lynn Toma
8. 440 U.S. at 509.
9. Id. at 510.
10. Justice Brennan directed the majority's attention to § 2(2) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. 152(2), which stipulated the eight categories of employers who are exempt from
coverage by the Act, and noted that church-operated schools were conspicuous in their
absence. In addition, Justice Brennan made reference to the Hartley Bill which would
have provided exemptions for religious and educational employers, among others, but
was never enacted. Justice Brennan regarded the bill's failure as an expression by
Congress that the Act was meant to cover all employers, even nonprofit employers like
religious schools, unless expressly excluded. 440 U.S. at 511-16.
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-ALLEGATIONS OF
ARBITRARY EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST PUBLIC UTILITY-Gay Law Students Ass'n v.
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d
592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
In June 1975, appellant Gay Law Students Association
and others filed a class action suit against Pacific Telephone
and Telegraph Co. (PT&T) and the California Fair Employ-
ment Practice Commission (FEPC). The complaint alleged
that PT&T practiced discrimination in the "hiring, firing and
promotion of employees"' and that, contrary to statutory man-
date, the FEPC had failed to take action to remedy the employ-
ment discrimination practiced by PT&T. Appellants sought
declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent PT&T from con-
tinuing such practices and to compel the FEPC to accept juris-
diction over complaints concerning employment discrimina-
tion against homosexuals.
PT&T demurred, maintaining that, even if it had adopted
the alleged policy of discrimination against homosexuals,
plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a cause of action. The
FEPC answered that the California Fair Employment Practice
Act (FEPA)2 did not authorize the FEPC to take action regard-
ing employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The trial court sustained PT&T's demurrer and denied the
request for a writ of mandate against the FEPC. From this
determination, the Association appealed.
In reversing the decision in favor of PT&T, the California
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' allegations of arbitrary
employment discrimination against homosexuals stated a
cause of action because the equal protection clause of the Cali-
fornia Constitution 3 places special obligations on a state-
protected utility to refrain from all forms of arbitrary employ-
ment discrimination. Additionally, the court concluded that
PT&T's alleged employment practices violated section 453(a)
of the Public Utilities Code that prohibits discrimination by a
public utility.' Finally, the court found that a cause of action
© 1980 by Katrina K. Morris.
1. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 24 Cal. 3d
458, 464, 595 P.2d 592, 595, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 17 (1979).
2. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1410-1433 (West 1971).
3. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
4. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 453(a) (West 1975) provides: "No public utility shall,
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had been stated against PT&T for its attempts to control the
political affiliations of its employees in violation of Labor Code
sections 1101 and 1102.1
The court began its examination of the constitutional issue
by accepting the premise that both state and federal equal
protection clauses clearly prohibit the state or any governmen-
tal entity from arbitrarily discriminating against any class of
qualified individuals in employment decisions.' In Morrison v.
Board of Education,7 the court held this general principle to
apply to homosexuals as well as to any other class of persons.
PT&T asserted that the alleged discrimination did not
involve state action; that the employment practices of a public
utility should be subject to no greater restrictions than those
placed on any other private employer in the state. The court,
however, found the public utility in many respects more akin
to a governmental entity than a private employer. State regula-
tion of the public utility's business practices and the grant of
such powers as eminent domain served to inextricably tie the
state to the conduct of the utility.'
Moreover, the court reasoned that interference with an
individual's fundamental right to work "particularly flout[ed]
constitutional principles"' when practiced by a state-protected
public utility. This interference was deemed especially signifi-
as to rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other respect, .. subject any
person to any prejudice or disadvantage."
5. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1101 (West 1971) reads in part:
No employer shall make, adopt, or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy:
(a) Forbidding or preventing employees from engaging or participating in
politics . . . .(b) Controlling or directing, or tending to control or direct
the political activities or affiliations of employees.
Similarly, CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 1971) states:
No employer shall coerce or influence or attempt to coerce or influence
his employees through or by means of threat of discharge or loss of em-
ployment, to adopt or follow or refrain from adopting or following any
particular course or line of political action or political activity.
6. Mr. Justice Tobriner, however, distinguished the equal protection clause of
the Federal Constitution from the equal protection clause of the California Constitu-
tion on the grounds that no explicit state action requirement is present in the State
Constitution. In Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 449 (1974), the court held that the equal protection provision was not meant to
apply to all private conduct. Similarly, in Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 268,
578 P.2d 925, 146 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1978), the court stated that, though it would not be
bound by federal decisions, it would take into consideration federal definition of state
action.
7. 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
8. 24 Cal. 3d at 469, 595 P.2d at 599, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
9. Id. at 470, 595 P.2d at 599, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
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cant for the individual whose skills lie in the telephonic indus-
try, where, due to the monopoly power of the public utility, no
comparable employment opportunities exist elsewhere. Like-
wise, there is an effect on the general public when, through use
of the necessary products and services offered by the utility, it
gives indirect support to employment practices it may not con-
done. As the monopoly power enjoyed by PT&T is derived
directly from the Public Utilities Commission, the court con-
cluded the state government expects the public utility not to
claim the "prerogatives of private autonomy that attach to a
purely private enterprise."'"
Although the court stated that it was not bound by any
federal definition of state action, it noted federal opinion con-
sistent with its holding. In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Co.," the United States Supreme Court held that
monopoly power over employment opportunities granted by
the state to a private entity could not be used unconstitu-
tionally. Although the entity in Steele that enjoyed a state-
protected monopoly was a labor union rather than an em-
ployer, the court could discern "no reason why that fact should
immunize [PT&T] from constitutional constraints."' 2
Next, the court held that the alleged PT&T employment
discrimination against homosexuals violated section 453 of the
Public Utilities Code which provides that no public utility shall
subject any person to prejudice or disadvantage. The court
reasoned that a state-protected public utility can wield much
control over its employees and affairs without the checks and
risks generally encountered by a private enterprise. In granting
monopoly power to PT&T, the court noted that the Legislature
was "not oblivious to the need to guard against misuse of
power""3 by the public utility. Although PT&T contended that
section 453 concerned the utility's dealings with its customers,
the court concluded that the language revealed a broad statu-
tory intent to prohibit employment discrimination as well.
Based on such finding, the plaintiffs had stated a cause of
action under section 2106 of the Public Utilities Code.'
4
10. Id.
11. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
12. 24 Cal. 3d at 474, 595 P.2d at 602, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
13. Id. at 476, 595 P.2d at 603, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
14. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2106 (West 1975) provides that any person who has
been injured by an illegal public utilities practice may institute an action for monetary
damages.
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Finally, the majority found a cause of action existed
against PT&T for interfering with plaintiff's political freedom
in violation of Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102. In the court's
opinion, the freedom protected by the statutes was not
"narrowly confined to partisan activity,"' 5 but included the
struggle of the homosexual for equal rights in the field of em-
ployment. As the complaint charged that PT&T discriminated
against homosexuals who supported this cause, it established
a cause of action.
In upholding the trial court's refusal to compel the FEPC
to accept jurisdiction over complaints concerning employment
discrimination against homosexuals, the court found that the
California Fair Employment Practice Act does not encompass
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The fact that
the legislature repeatedly amended FEPA in recent years 6 was
a strong indication that the original 1959 Act should not be
read as a bar to all forms of arbitrary discrimination. Addition-
ally, the FEPC's construction of the Act since its passage had
failed to include jurisdiction over complaints based upon sex-
ual orientation. For these reasons the court held that the legis-
lature did not intend to bring concern for homosexuals under
FEPA.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Richardson agreed with
the FEPC ruling but maintained that the regulated monopoly
status of PT&T should not automatically require that it abro-
gate its freedom of choice as to the hiring, firing and promotion
of employees. 7 Instead, he suggested that the court look to see
if the public utility is acting in compliance with the antidiscri-
mination provision of FEPA. Absent some clear constitutional
or statutory authority, Richardson argued that the court should
not attempt to police the general employment practices of pri-
vate employers.
The supreme court in PT&T, by finding workable alterna-
tives to FEPA for establishing a cause of action, evinced a
strong interest in guaranteeing equal employment opportuni-
ties for all persons regardless of sexual preference. For the indi-
vidual trained in a skill valuable only in the telephonic indus-
15. 24 Cal. 3d at 487, 595 P.2d at 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
16. Legislative amendments have protected successively the categories of sex
(1970 Cal. Stats., ch. 1508, § 4), age (1972 Cal. Stats., ch. 1144, § 1; 1977 Cal. Stats.,
ch. 851, § 2), physical handicap (1973 Cal. Stats., ch. 1189, § 6), medical condition
(1975 Cal. Stats., ch. 431, § 5), and marital status (1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 1195, § 5).
17. 24 Cal. 3d at 494, 595 P.2d at 614, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
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try, the need for protection from arbitrary employment dis-
crimination on the basis of homosexuality was obvious. But the
court did not limit its ruling to those with specialized skills; it
extended the constitutional restrictions placed on the public
utility to homosexuals whose job training could be utilized by
any other employers. Two possible explanations exist for this
ruling: first, the court wanted to avoid the issue of determining
which technical skills could be utilized only by the public util-
ity; second, the California court, although it refused to find
that homosexuals were an enumerated class under FEPA, con-
cluded that, where a state entity is the employer, homosexual-
ity should not be a basis for discrimination against any quali-
fied individual.
Katrina K. Morris

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS DOES NOT
REQUIRE AN ADVERSARY HEARING PRIOR TO COM-
MITMENT OF CHILDREN TO MENTAL HOSPITALS BY
THEIR PARENT OR GUARDIAN. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct.
2493 (1979).
This class action suit was brought against Georgia mental
health officials in federal district court on behalf of two named
minors, J.L. and J.R.' The plaintiffs sought a judgment declar-
ing that Georgia's statutory procedure for the voluntary com-
mitment of children to state mental hospitals violated the due
process clause of the United States Constitution by failing to
provide the children a hearing prior to commitment. Plaintiffs
requested an injunction against future enforcement of the com-
mitment provisions and also sought release of the minors from
a Georgia state mental hospital to which they had been com-
mitted for treatment under the challenged procedures.'
In accordance with the Georgia statute providing for vol-
untary commitment of children, 3 J.L. and J.R. were temporar-
ily admitted to Central State Regional Hospital for
"observation and diagnosis" upon the application of their re-
spective parent and guardian.' Under that statute, if, after
observing a child, the superintendent of the state mental hospi-
tal determines that the child shows "evidence of mental ill-
ness" and is "suitable for treatment" in the hospital, the child
may be admitted "for such period and under such conditions
© 1980 by Page Humphrey.
1. J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976).
2. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.1
(Harrison 1969) (amended 1978) that provides:
The superintendent of any facility may receive for observation and diag-
nosis. . . any individual under 18 years of age for whom such application
is made by his parent or guardian . . . . If found to show evidence of
mental illness and to be suitable for treatment, such person may be given
care and treatment at such facility for such period and under such condi-
tions as may be authorized by law.
3. Plaintiffs argued that their constitutional rights were being "violated by the
operation of the statutory scheme by which they [had] been . ..involuntarily con-
fined in state mental hospitals 'without being afforded a meaningful and complete
opportunity to be heard. . . .' "Id. They further argued that they were being involun-
tarily committed by their parents or guardians "under the guise of a 'voluntary' proce-
dure." Id. The court, however, concluded that plaintiffs failed to directly attack the
constitutionality of the statute's test for voluntariness of treatment and therefore, did
not feel compelled to rule on the issue of voluntariness. Id.
4. "Since application for discharge may be requested only after five days, receipt
for observation and diagnosis means that a child is detained for a minimum of five
days." Id. at 134.
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as may be authorized by law." 5 Pursuant to these statutory
guidelines, J.L. and J.R. were committed without a hearing to
Central State upon the recommendation of the Central State
admissions team.'
The district court ruled that, because the Georgia statute
failed to provide the plaintiffs with a hearing prior to commit-
ment, it had deprived them of their liberty without due process
as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The lower court
ordered the defendants to provide a hearing in these cases,
reasoning that due process, although flexible, traditionally in-
cludes at least the right to a hearing before an impartial fact-
finder.7
Furthermore, the district court expressed concern that
many parents might treat mental hospitals as dumping
grounds for unwanted children and therefore stressed the need
for a pre-commitment hearing or other procedural safeguards.
Since the Georgia procedure depended solely upon the discre-
tion of hospital superintendents, the court found it "too arbi-
trary to satisfy due process" in light of the "inexactness of
psychiatry" and the potential unreliability of information upon
which the admission decision was based.' Consequently, the
court enjoined the defendants from detaining or confining chil-
dren in state mental hospitals pursuant to the voluntary ad-
missions statute.9
The United States Supreme Court narrowly reversed the
lower court's decision in an opinion written by Chief Justice
Burger. 0 The Court balanced "individual, family and societal
5. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.1 (Harrison 1969) (amended 1978).
6. Parham v. JR., 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2497-98 (1979). The admissions decision at
Central State is made by an "admissions evaluator," who is either a Ph. D. in psychol-
ogy, a social worker or a mental health trained nurse, along with the "admitting
physician," or superintendent, who is a psychiatrist. Their stated standard for admis-
sion is "whether or not hospitalization is the more appropriate treatment" for the
child. Id. at 2500.
7. 412 F. Supp. at 137.
8. 99 S. Ct. at 2502.
9. The Court further ordered the defendant mental health officials to proceed as
expeditiously as reasonably possible, (1) to provide necessary physical resources and
personnel for whatever non-hospital facilities are deemed by them to be most appropri-
ate for these children, and (2) to place these children in such non-hospital facilities as
soon as reasonably appropriate. 412 F. Supp. at 139.
10. The case was initially argued before the Court during the 1977 Term and was
then reargued in 1978 after consolidation with Secretary of Public Welfare v. Institu-
tionalized Juveniles, 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979).
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interests" in scrutinizing the constitutional adequacy of the
defendants' procedures" and applied the three-pronged due
process test established in Matthews v. Eldridge."2
First, the Court examined the nature of the private inter-
est affected by the commitment decision and found it to be "a
combination of the child's and parents' concerns.' 3 Next, the
Court examined the risk that Georgia's commitment procedure
might erroneously deprive a child of his liberty. In this respect,
the Court also discussed the potential value of additional pro-
cedural safeguards in the form of pre-admission hearings." Fi-
nally, the Court examined the state's interests in its admission
provisions and discussed the practical burdens which pre-
admission hearings would entail. 5 The Court concluded that
formal adversary or judicial hearings prior to commitment are
not required when a parent or guardian seeks to commit a child
to a state mental hospital. 6
Focusing initially on the child, the majority recognized
that a child has a substantial interest in avoiding unnecessary
institutionalization and in not being stigmatized as a mental
patient by an erroneous decision of the state hospital superin-
tendent." The Court emphasized, however, that although a
child's interests are significant, they have historically been
qualified by the rights and duties of his parents. In evaluating
the commitment decision, the majority accordingly subordi-
nated the child's interests to those of the parents. 8
Appellees contended that a child's constitutional right to
liberty is so great and the likelihood that his parents may un-
justifiably request his commitment is so high that only a formal
hearing prior to commitment would adequately protect the
child's due process rights." The majority agreed with the lower
court that some parents may not act in the best interests of
their chidren and may look upon a mental institution as a
11. 99 S. Ct. at 2502-06.
12. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
13. 99 S. Ct. at 2503.
14. Id. at 2506-09.
15. Id. at 2502.
16. Id. at 2509.
17. Id. at 2503-04. The majority opinion acknowledged the district court's reli-
ance on In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), in which the Court held that the liberty interests
of juveniles are protected by due process rights to notice of charges, to counsel, to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses and to the privilege against self-
incrimination prerequisite to institutionalization. 99 S. Ct. at 2501 n. 7.
18. Id. at 2504.
19. Id.
1980]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
"dumping ground" for unwanted or troublesome children. The
Court emphasized, however, that while the possibility of such
potential abuse warranted some caution, the probability that
such abuse would occur was too minimal to overcome the law's
traditional presumption that parents generally do act in their
child's best interests. 20 The Court found the appellees' argu-
ment overbroad and stated:
Simply because the decision of a parent [to apply for the
child's commitment] is not agreeable to the child or be-
cause it involves risks does not automatically transfer the
power to make that decision from the parents to some
agency or officer of the state . . . . Neither state officials
nor federal courts are equipped to review such parental
decisions .2
The Court concluded that, absent actual abuses, the tradi-
tional presumption should apply.
2
Appellees' cited Planned Parenthood v. Danforth 2 as au-
thority limiting the traditional rights of parents when a child's
mental or physical well-being is at stake. In Planned
Parenthood, the Court held that parents did not have absolute
veto power over their child's decision to have an abortion. The
Parham Court distinguished Planned Parenthood by noting
that parents possessed no absolute right to commit their chil-
dren under the Georgia procedure since the hospital superin-
tendent was statutorily required to assess each child's need for
hospitalization independently of the parents' decision .2 The
Court reasoned that the superintendent's responsibility, to-
gether with the presumption of parental concern, reduced the
risk of erroneous deprivation of the child's liberty.
The Court used a similar analysis in considering the situa-
tion of appellee J.R., a ward of the state who was committed
to the Georgia facility at the request of the state as guardian.
The majority opinion reasoned that, although a parent is moti-
vated by love and family interests, the state has a statutory
duty to consider the best interests of the child, and while due
process considerations may vary depending upon whether the
state or a natural parent makes the request for commitment,
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2504-05.
22. Id. at 2505.
23. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
24. 99 S. Ct. at 2505.
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potential differences between the two do not necessitate differ-
ent admission procedures. 5
The Court acknowledged that, due to the risk of error,
review procedures for children who are wards of the state may
need to be different from those used to review the continuing
need for commitment of a child with natural parents. Although
the majority expressed concern that a child without natural
parents may indeed be "lost in the shuffle," the Court con-
cluded that such matters were for the district court to deter-
mine on remand.2
The Court next considered the state's interests, which it
ultimately balanced against the privacy interests of parent and
child. The opinion conceded a legitimate state interest in re-
serving public mental health facilities for those genuinely in
need of care." The Court was satisfied that Georgia's statute,
authorizing the superintendent of each state mental hospital to
base his commitment decision on "whether a prospective pa-
tient is mentally ill and whether the patient will likely benefit
from hospital care,"28 adequately achieved the purpose. Geor-
gia's discharge statute,"0 imposing a continuing duty on hospi-
tal superintendents to release patients who no longer need hos-
pitalization, provides an additional safeguard against unduly
long commitments.
The Court recognized a second state interest in avoiding
the use of unnecessary procedural obstacles that may deter the
mentally ill or their families from seeking mental health care.30
Adversarial, pre-admission hearings were cited as examples of
such obstacles that interfere with family privacy and unduly
burden the state.
Furthermore, the majority described a state interest in
allocating resources such as hospital funds and psychiatrists'
time for the diagnosis and treatment of in-patients rather than
for determining the eligibility of prospective patients. 3' The
Court concluded that the increased cost of providing additional
procedural safeguards would outweigh any potential benefit to
the children.3 2 In sum, since the state interests in not providing
25. Id. at 2512.
26. Id. at 2512-13.
27. Id. at 2505.
28. Id.
29. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.2 (Harrison 1969) (amended in 1978).
30. 99 S. Ct. at 2505.
31. Id. at 2506.
32. Id. n.14.
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hearings were great and the risk of erroneous deprivation of the
child's liberty in the absence of hearings was minimal, the
Court was not obliged to guarantee additional protections.
Finally, the Court considered what type of procedure
would adequately protect a child's constitutional rights in the
commitment situation and concluded that
the risk of error inherent in the parental decision to have
a child institutionalized for mental health care is suffi-
ciently great that some kind of inquiry should be made by
a 'neutral fact-finder' to determine whether the statutory
requirements for admission are satisfied.3
The Court required that the fact-finder interview the child,
make an extensive examination of the child's background
"from all available sources," and have "authority to refuse to
admit any child who does not satisfy the medical standards for
admission." 3' The Court also mandated a similarly indepen-
dent review procedure to be conducted by each state mental
hospital to determine a child's continuing need for treatment.
The majority emphasized that an informal medical deci-
sion-making process adequately satisfied the admissions stan-
dard set forth above, so long as the decision maker was free to
make an independent judgment of a child's condition.35 The
Court concluded that a more formal hearing would not signifi-
cantly reduce the risks of error in the admission process."
Moreover, the Court envisioned a potential harm to the family
or to the parent-child relationship that could result if a judicial
hearing was mandatory. 7
In examining the requirements of due process, the Court
urged that it "has never been thought to require that a neutral
and detached trier of fact be law-trained or a judicial or admin-
istrative officer." The Court further determined that "neither
judges nor administrative hearing officers are better qualified
than psychiatrists to render psychiatric judgments. '3 There-
fore, the majority concluded that a judicial pre-admission
hearing was not constitutionally required in the instant case
33. Id. at 2506.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2507.
36. Id. at 2509.
37. Id. at 2508.
38. Id. at 2506.
39. Id. at 2506-07 (quoting In re Roger S., 19 Cal.3d 921, 941, 569 P.2d 1286,
1299, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 311 (1977) (Clark, J., dissenting)).
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since Georgia's psychiatric review procedure sufficiently pro-
tected all interests. 0
It is important to note that the Court limited its opinion
to the determination of constitutionally sufficient admission
procedures. The Court did not consider what procedures for
review are independently necessary to justify continuing a
child's confinement beyond the evaluation period. The major-
ity did hold that some type of review procedure was necessary
in order to provide a check against possible arbitrariness in the
initial admission decision, although it did not set forth any
specific guidelines as to what constitutes an adequate review
procedure or who may conduct such a review. Similarly, in its
discussion of the need for a "neutral fact-finder" regarding the
admission decision, the Court held that such person must have
the ability to make an independent judgment of the child's
condition. The Court failed, however, to provide criteria for
deterimining the independence of such fact-finder.
A strongly worded dissent argued that the majority had
adhered to an all-or-nothing approach in its consideration of
whether a pre-commitment judicial hearing was required or
whether any hearing was required at all." The dissent argued
for less formal alternatives to a full adversary hearing." This
dissent, coupled with the Court's unwillingness to fully explore
the potential conflicts of interest between the state as guardian
and the state as health care provider and between parent and
child, make further litigation in this area a certainty.
Page Humphrey
40. 99 S.Ct. at 2511.
41. Id. at 2515-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. The dissent argued that post-admission review hearings may adequately
protect a child's due process rights in certain delineated circumstances. Id. at 2516-
20.
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